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Introduction
There has been a notable shift m the debate across the straits concerning Taiwan s relationship to the larger 
political entity known as People s Republic of China over the last five years The debate over Taiwan s future 
(or the Republic of China s future) pits concerns of Taiwanese with the right to local self determination and 
insulation from potential authoritarian interference by the mainland against the overarching goal of cultural and 
territorial integrity free from the shadow of colonialism held up by mamlanders Recently the debate over the 
future of Taiwan is earned out in newspapers in postings of on line discussions and in other media on multiple 
continents most of which are accessible to all parties involved Moreover both sides of the argument are 
admitted into the discussion Although the debate is heated at times it unfolds across the globe with a 
transparency unimaginable even ten years ago In addition Taiwanese newspapers recognize that the question 
of Taiwan s relationship with the mainland is inseparable from the rapidly unfolding process of globalization 
and integration throughout the world—the final consequences of which remain opaque The future of Taiwan 
can no longer be reduced to an either/or umfication/independence equation
Although Taiwanese newspapers continue to display a distinctly Taiwanese perspective even to the pomt 
of unfairly characterizing the intentions of mainland policies regarding exchanges with Taiwan the term 
zhuanxing or structural transformation is employed again and again in descriptions of contemporary affairs 
Structural transformation implies that Taiwan is playing a new and complex game of maintaining its 
economic base and political autonomy through overlapping patterns of engagement with the People s Republic 
of Chma the other nations of East Asia, the Umted States and the rest of the world Self preservation is no 
longer a matter of simply standing up to the threatening Communist presence Rather it is a matter of systematic 
negotiation within a panoply of international organizations—everything from the Boy Scouts to the World 
Trade Organization—on the one hand and mtemal transformations aimed at increasing the value added to 
Taiwan s industrial cultural and educational capital on the other The political and military back and forth 
between the Nationalist Republic of Chma and the Communist People s Republic of China has been a deliberate 
chess game spanning the last seventy years Each side played on the other s weaknesses and appealed to the 
international community for legitimacy while trying to comer and destroy from within the other But today the 
very definition of China and nation is challenged by dizzying economic and technological transformation 
The chessboard on which that battle was waged has started to come apart That is not to say that the battle has 
ended just that its rules have become murky
This paper introduces the historical background of the present confrontations and negotiations between 
Taiwan and the mainland both in terms of Formosa s ( ‘the beautiful island in Portuguese) convoluted relations 
with the European powers the Qing dynasty (1644 1911) Japan and the United States and in terms of the 
relationship of the Nationalist Republic of Chma to the Communist People s Republic of Chma It then turns to 
a consideration of the debate on sovereignty between these two political entities and how that debate relates to 
the past events the present legitimacy of both entities and the new challenges of globalization What are the 
economic cultural and technological ties that continue to bind Taiwan and the mainland despite senous 
differences7 Finally what possibilities are there for a long term peaceful solution7
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Part One
A Short History of Taiwan’s Special Status
A basic outline of Taiwan s cultural and political history and the sources therein of its disputed status is 
essential to understanding the uncertainties of its future The onginal inhabitants of Taiwan who certainly did 
not use that name—or the Portugese Formosa (beautiful island)—to describe this lush island were Malayo 
Polynesian aborigines with no cultural affiliation with Chma whatsoever Today those native Taiwanese known 
in Chinese as sbandir en make up approximately 2 percent of Taiwan s population and are virtually absent from 
urban centers
There were sporadic visits to the island of Taiwan by the Chinese and the Portuguese in the sixteenth 
century The Portuguese produced records of those landings from the 1590s but attempted no permanent 
settlements It was rather Holland and Spam that established colonial settlements m Taiwan (in 1624 and 1626 
respectively) as part of their larger competition m trade throughout Southeast Asia Neither country made any 
senous investment m the infrastructure of these tmy outposts in Taiwan however seeing them as but stops on 
larger trade routes
When the Ming dynasty collapsed under the relentless attacks of the Manchu armies in 1644 the political 
order m East Asia was shaken to its foundations and the future of China clouded The Mmg dynasty had been 
the cultural and military power m East Asia and its overthrow by northern barbarians from the periphery 
disturbed the mtemational order for centimes The remnants of the Mmg army gathered m southern China to 
resist but lacked the conviction and organization necessary No small number of Chmese attempted to cross to 
Taiwan fearing the wrath of the Manchu lords It was the Dutch however who seized the moment and took 
over the island m 1646 They were soon displaced however by the Chmese General Zheng Chenggong in 
1661 a Mmg dynasty loyalist Zheng Chenggong was a product of the protean fluid new economic order that 
emerged along the coasts of China and maintained close ties with it Piracy (or perhaps we should say resistance 
to Qing rule) became a senous issue in the second half of the seventeenth century and the new Manchu (Qmg) 
dynasty took the extreme step of shutting down major ports m an attempt to stifle it, and Mmg loyalists on 
Taiwan Taiwan ceased to be a major trading center as a result The Mmg loyalists on Taiwan remained a 
senous ìmtant to the Qmg dynasty and the cause for the first attempt to isolate the island
The Qmg dynasty was eventually successful through a vanety of political and military venues in annexing 
Taiwan in 1683 after Zheng s death and making it a part of Fujian provmce Chmese immigration from Fujian 
began in earnest from the eighteenth century and Taiwan became an indisputable part of the Qmg dynasty 
Before we say Taiwan was part of China however we must consider carefully the nature of Manchu rule 
Ethnic Chmese were not the ruling class of the Qmg dynasty—although they eventually dominated the 
bureaucracy—and the Qmg dynasty included regions such as Manchuna and Tibet whose residents thought of 
themselves as part of a larger Manchu order but not part of China In fact the Chmese term for this realm hua 
(as in Zhonghua the formal term for China today) denoted a cultural and economic sphere transcending 
ethnicity
The Qmg dynasty was an extremely efficient agricultural empire So successful was its peaceful rule that a 
massive increase in rural population occurred with senous implications for Chma today Population pressure 
drove immigration to Taiwan m the eighteenth century from the adjacent provinces of Fujian and Guangdong 
The Hakka minonty people of Southern China and the Hokkien people of Southern Fujian made up a significant 
portion of those immigrants In 1886 a more densely populated Taiwan became an mdependent provmce of 
China with a governor assigned from Beijing
By the mid nineteenth century however the threat of foreign powers returned after two hundred years of 
insularity Following the defeat of Chma by Britain and France in the Second Opium War (1856-60) a new 
senes of agreements was negotiated opening Chma to the West The humiliation of the Qmg dynasty at the 
hands of England and France during the Second Opium War resulted m the Treaty of Tiantsm (1858) which 
forced the opening o f a treaty port m Taiwan Taiwan thus became agam a focal point for the economic impact 
of foreign powers In addition the Chnstiamty inspired Taiping Rebellion (1850 1864) of the mid nineteenth
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century nearly toppled the Qing dynasty and loosened further its control of peripheral regions The country 
limped on but its central administration was considerably demoralized and its legitimacy uncertain The 
potential for commercial and colonial exploitation of a weakened China was immensely tempting for Western 
powers More importantly neighboring Japan felt an acute need to create an imperial sphere of influence All of 
the important powers in Europe already had one and Japan was anxious to catch up
The Qing dynasty suffered a total defeat in the Smo Japanese War and was forced to accept the infamous 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) by which the Qmg dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan Taiwan was to become the 
cornerstone of Japan s empire in Asia later known as the Co prosperity Sphere Because Taiwan served as a 
model colony Japan invested considerable funds m its industrialization and modernization Although the 
harshness of Japanese colonial rule is indisputable so also is the fact that Taiwan developed in a considerably 
different direction than it might have as a penpheral province of the Qmg dynasty Japanese was made the 
national language of Taiwan and many Japanese settled in this colony as part of the plan of cultural and 
economic integration Citizenship m the Japanese empire was offered to all Taiwanese although that citizenship 
was abruptly withdrawn at the end of the Second World War Taiwan was critical to the Japanese effort m the 
Pacific War because of its mdustnal and logistical capacity As early as the Cairo Conference however the 
Allies decided that Taiwan should revert to China after the war was won
But mainland China had been tom apart by civil war before during and after the Second World War and it 
was not so clear who should have control of this island when it reverted The Nationalists (Guomindang*) and 
the Communists (Gongchandang) had fought a multi front conflict for military and political dommation of 
Chma since the late 1920s Because the Japanese invasion pushed the Nationalists to Chungqing on the 
economic periphery they found themselves at a strategic disadvantage when the Japanese unexpectedly and 
unconditionally surrendered m 1945 The Nationalists cut off from their base of support and tom from within 
suffered a senes of defeats m the late 1940s and ended up as a government in exile in Taiwan facing impending 
invasion in 1950
The outbreak of the Korean War and the new policy of containment for Communism adopted by the United 
States changed Taiwan s situation significantly The United States felt increasing pressure to support all 
opposition to Communism on an international scale Considerable disillusionment with the actions of the 
Communist Party after it had taken power also increased sympathy with the administration led by General 
Chiang Kaishek in Taiwan Taiwan was integrated into the United States Pacific Defense System and in 1954 
the United States and the Republic of China signed an iron clad Mutual Defense Treaty The Republic of China 
also continued to occupy the China seat on the Security Council of the United Nations with American backing
The economic and strategic importance of the People s Republic of China continued to grow however to 
the pomt that it could no longer be ignored by the United States President Richard Nixon visited Beijing m 
1972 paving the way for normalization of relations with the People s Republic of China and the end of formal 
diplomatic ties with the Republic of China m Taiwan Such a shift resulted from the growing realization m the 
United States after the Vietnam War that there was no alternative to engagement with the People s Republic of 
Chma and that the People s Republic of China and the Soviet Union did not form a contiguous political bloc As 
a result of the normalization process Taiwan no longer enjoyed formal recognition as a sovereign state by any 
major mdustnal nation The People s Republic of Chma soon after assumed the China seat on the Secunty 
Council and spoke thereafter as the official representative of the Chinese mainland Ambiguity remamed as to 
whether the Umted States had recognized the People s Republic s sovereignty over Taiwan The United States 
supported the idea of one China and recognized the People s Republic as the legitimate government of China 
It might follow logically that if Taiwan were part of that one Chma the United States supported the control of 
Taiwan by the People s Republic of China US support of Taiwan thereafter however suggested that such a 
conclusion was mistaken
Taiwan did not wither away The Taiwanese economy continued to grow and it became a major player m 
high technology fields such as memory chips Taiwan has remamed within the top three countries in terms of 
foreign reserves and continues to play a vital role in a variety of international organizations Moreover the 
Republic of Chma on Taiwan revoked martial law m 1990 and allowed freedom of expression and political 
organization unprecedented anywhere m mainland Chma and probably in Chinese history The legislature had 
previously been dominated by exiles from the mainland and their descendents and offered few opportunities
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either for opposition parties or natives of Taiwan to participate m the political process Critical reforms in the 
1990s changed this state of affairs and have made Taiwan one of the most vibrant democracies m Asia With the 
return of Hong Kong to the People s Republic of China in 1997 and the return of Macao in 1999 the question 
of Taiwan s future has become increasingly critical In 1984 Deng Xiao Ping spoke of one country two 
systems implying greater flexibility concerning the path to reunification
President Lee Tenghui the first native of Taiwan to be elected president of the Republic of China initiated 
a program for a slow methodical Special State to State Relationship with the mainland from 1999 The 
approach was interpreted as a move towards greater independence and led to a senes of provocative military 
exercises by the People s Republic of China aimed at discouraging the Taiwanese from interpreting such 
rhetonc as a first step towards complete autonomy The results of the mainland s response were mixed and led 
to the election of Chen Shui Píen of the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000 who had previously advocated a 
more complete form of mdependence than had Lee Tenghui Chen s statements m August of 2002 concerning 
Chma and Taiwan as One Country on Each Side of the Straits brought forth considerable protest from 
Beijing but not on the scale that might have been expected The combination of increasing overt tension 
between the Republic of Chma and the People s Republic of China with mcreased cultural and economic ties is 
not easily explained Taiwan often appears to be heading m two different directions at the same time
Part Two
The Question of Sovereignty for Taiwan
Taiwan s history is inseparable from the lingering shadow of the conflict between colonialism and self 
determination that has haunted the world since the Treaty of Versailles The US policy of recognizing the 
People s Republic of China as the proper representative of Chma and supporting the concept of one China 
should logically have given the People s Republic sovereignty over Taiwan In most cases international law 
assumes that sovereignty to be undivided and complete 2 China Korea and Germany proved exceptions US 
support of the policy of one Chma however sets the Taiwan mainland case apart from the other two So also 
the degree to which both Taiwan and the People s Republic of China have been integrated mto the international 
community and engage international institutions simultaneously is distinct The two entities even cooperate in 
certain disputes And now that Taiwanese Arms have invested millions of dollars in mainland China and 
Taiwanese citizens have gone as far as to purchase property there the question of what sovereignty signifies 
and whether independence for Taiwan is possible in any scenano comes to the forefront
Taiwan has many features of sovereign state as we currently define it Taiwan has its own laws its own 
legislature its own bureaucracy including a foreign minister its own military forces and its own distinct 
cultural traditions And certainly an argument can be made that it is entirely possible for an independent nation 
off the coast of the People s Republic of China to exist that maintains close economic ties to China and a 
Chmese culture The relationship of Canada with the United States would be a perfect example
Taiwanese citizens express justified concern for the curtailment of rights that would result from increased 
mainland influence Yet there has not been a significant exodus from Hong Kong in the last few years despite 
increasing control from Beijing Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the rally for accountable government 
throughout East Asia whether in Beijing Seoul or Taipei has quieted down significantly There has been a 
notable shift towards a concern with immediate economic circumstances and less interest in direct political 
engagement on the part of many citizens throughout Asia
Nor is the pro independence movement in Taiwan clearly opposed to the possibility of a larger Chmese 
federation The argument made by the pro independence scholar Hong Zhesheng for Taiwanese autonomy does 
not rule out possible future reunification nor does it dispute the cultural continuity that makes up China3 
Rather Hong stresses the ambiguities m the term nation state and the uncertainties aroused by the onginal 
transfer of sovereignty from the Qing (which was a dynasty not coequal with China ) to Japan and then to the 
nationalist Republic of China Hong s point is that any conception of China that implies an imperative for 
reunification is simplistic 4 Mainstream Taiwan newspapers also carry elaborate discussions of the abstractions 
of race culture and economics m recent days that suggest an unprecedented openness m the debate concerning 
Taiwan s identity and future
The difficulty for the outsider lies m distinguishing between the overt rhetoric of condemnation or 
indignation towards mainland proposals on the part of the government and the general attitude of most 
Taiwanese whether students shopkeepers or businessmen with interests on the mainland The ease with which 
mamlanders and Taiwanese interact with each other in the Umted States and elsewhere as well as the broad 
range of topics on which they agree is striking Moreover mainland Chmese are so attracted to Taiwanese 
popular culture and economic opportunities and happy to interact with Taiwanese that it would be hard to say 
that either side considers the other an enemy Rather mamlanders and Taiwanese simply agree not to discuss 
certain sensitive topics
Perhaps it would be accurate to say that Taiwanese and mamlanders engage simultaneously in two separate 
discourses At one level they embrace a common culture a common sense of interdependence and a common 
hope for the future At the same time both sides perceive the actions of the other as dangerous and destructive 
actions often attributed to the respective governments Both political units move ineluctably towards 
integration as represented by the recent establishment of direct commercial flights between Taiwan and the 
mainland Yet the military of the People s Republic of Chma publishes elaborate descriptions of how a military 
campaign against Taiwan would be waged
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Part Three
Economic Aspects of the Taiwan Question
The Taiwanese media openly admits the growing importance of mainland Chma for the Taiwanese economy 
and in most cases does not articulate fears of the loss of sovereignty that might result from economic 
integration Recent articles acknowledge that the mainland market will become only more important as the 
economic slowdown reduces US demand The greatest worry articulated in the Taiwanese media is that Taiwan 
is no longer competitive with the mainland because of higher costs and less flexibility and therefore mainland 
concerns may be more attractive to skilled workers from Taiwan5
Meanwhile the Taiwanese electronics industry has aggressively pursued integration with Singapore Hong 
Kong Shenzhou and Shanghai as part of a global competitive strategy Such links are considered to be both 
reliable and potentially permanent Many discussions in the media concern the jockeying for economic 
advantage throughout East Asia the issue is constructing a favorable network of industrial allies No binary 
division between Taiwan and the mainland is mentioned m these discussions
Judging from the Taiwan media s presentation the major issue for Taiwan m its battle for survival and 
prosperity is the maintenance of high added value m manufacturing The fear expressed m most Taiwanese 
articles treating the economy is that Taiwan may become a second Japan locked in a dated economic system 
and unable to make fundamental structural changes Japan had previously served as a model for Taiwanese 
industrial and economic development Although not explicitly stated recent doubts about Japan s economic 
significance imply that the relative status of the mainland as an economic partner has been enhanced Such 
articles do not state that the People s Republic of Chma could be an economic model for Taiwan Yet the 
relative uncertainty about Taiwan s economic ties to Japan and the United States expressed does suggest that 
the mainland is now one of several critical economic engines that Taiwan must balance 6 Taiwan continues to 
run a trade surplus with the mainland and the amount of cross straight trade grows every year7
The demands for reform imposed on the People s Republic of China as part of its admission to the World 
Trade Organization have given leaders such as Luo Gan and Zhu Rongji the bureaucratic justification required 
to implement far reaching streamlining of the Chmese government The result so far has been that as the central 
government ministries have been reduced from forty to twenty nine and sprawling bureaucracies are pruned 
the People s Republic of China will have an administrative system that looks increasingly similar to that of the 
Republic of China in Taiwan8 Moreover the increasing autonomy of some sectors of the Chmese body politic 
may approach Hong Kong or even Taiwan eventually in their relative autonomy from Beijing 9 Coastal centers 
of trade and manufacturing such as Qingdao or Shenzhen feature an economic and political system built on 
complex ties with the outside world and other regions of Chma Such entities make up their own game plan for 
development with little interference from Beijing at the administrative level—although they are not permitted to 
establish formal ties with Taiwan The anticipated standard of living difference between Taiwan and the major 
urban centers of China is no longer significant and Taiwanese businessmen feel entirely at home moving 
between the two although the undeveloped parts of China remam mired m poverty
The imbricated economic links between the two shores are not a mere product of the entrepreneurs leading 
a vanguard but run to the very political and economic centers of power For example Jiang Jinheng the son of 
the (now retired) President of the People s Republic of China Jiang Zemm has teamed up in business with 
Wang Wenyang the son of Wang Yongqmg President of Taiwan s massive conglomerate Formosa Plastics 
Group These two scions of privilege representing the elite culture of Taiwan and the mainland are starting a 
joint venture m silicon wafer fabrication in Shanghai The project has been approved If there were a massive 
conflict brewing at a high level m these two governments one would expect these two men to know about it I 
do not mean to dismiss the possibility of actual military conflict should the People s Republic of China feel 
such a move was unavoidable because some aspect of the Taiwan issue threatened the very legitimacy of that 
entity 10 but the general trends at the very top of both governments do not mdicate that they are bracing for 
conflict As long as certain fundamental ideological tenets are not violated considerable flexibility exists
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The internet has become a critical part of the economy and the basic social structure in both Taiwan and the 
mainland The People s Republic of Chma also has shown a deep commitment at all levels to the international 
development of the web even at the nsk of greater access to information for its citizens Jiang Zemin addressed 
the World Computer Congress m August 2000 with these words Virtual reality is profoundly changing the 
way people produce learn and live creating a a borderless information space around the world 11 Such a 
vision of Chma s future does not imply complete freedom but there is considerable evidence of greater 
transparency within the government and m society as a whole on the mainland There have been startling 
changes m the administration of government agencies in China using on line systems many accessible from 
around the world 12 Such internal shifts open up more areas for cooperation and analogy with Taiwan Both 
sides are transforming and both are domg so with an intense awareness of the other
Part Four
Cultural Ties between Taiwan and the Mainland
The term China is more of a cultural than a political or geographical designation One might say that if one 
speaks Chinese and follows Chinese precedents for human relations one is m China regardless of one s 
physical location—all the more so with the advent of the mtemet Until modem concepts of the nation state 
were introduced to East Asia in the late nineteenth century Chineseness was a product of cultural habits and 
language rather than race or religion The political unit that included Taiwan formally was known as the Qing 
dynasty That dynasty was commanded by the Manchus who were not ethnic Chinese and included Tibet 
Xinjiang and Mongolia The authority of the Qmg was based on the acceptance of cultural norms and not on 
the defining characteristics of the nation state The very term for China m Chmese Zhongguo or middle 
country implies a center for a larger cultural and economic unit that is equivalent to all of East Asia China 
received tribute from the nations of that cultural space before the nineteenth century but also granted them 
considerable autonomy There was a clear difference between the provinces and the mdependent states with a 
tributary status like Korea Yet any individual who embraced the Chmese cultural tradition whether the 
teachings of Confucius or the style of classical Chmese writing became a part of the Chmese cultural 
continuum
Today as well particularly with the advent of advanced technology for instantaneous communication and 
the growth of a significant Chmese diaspora throughout the world the limits of what is meant by China are 
not clear Chmese businesses and immigrant communities maintain close ties with the mainland Complete 
assimilation is not regarded as the highest goal Most importantly the government of the People s Republic of 
Chma has openly encouraged the development of an international Chmese network even when such a network 
decreases Beijing s direct authority For example Chmese universities have for the first time started to organize 
alumni throughout the world as part of this grander scheme of an international Chma
Language lies at the core of the Chmese identity despite the fact that Chma has so many mutually 
unintelligible dialects Although the standard Chinese language employed in television broadcasts and formal 
interactions in Taiwan and the mainland is essentially the same (let us call it Mandarin here) there are several 
important respects in which Chmese language on Taiwan is distinct First many of the Chmese characters 
employed m Taiwan are written differently than on the mainland The People s Republic of Chma adopted a 
simplified form for the Chmese characters and promulgated it throughout the mainland m the 1950s Taiwan 
under Nationalist administration has retained the more complex forms of the Chmese characters down to the 
present day 13 That said most educated Taiwanese and mainlanders have computer programs that allow them to 
read texts in either form of the characters and most readers in both places find both forms comprehensible 
Many web pages in Chmese throughout the world are functional m either system
The second issue in the Chmese language is the romamzation of Chmese pronunciation The People s 
Republic of China has adopted a system of romamzation called Pinyin that is consistent and now accepted 
throughout the world m the media and academia The value of a standard form of romamzation granted the 
relative chaos that has resulted from previous haphazard attempts is not to be underestimated Nevertheless the 
pmym system features the initial consonants Q Z Zh C and X which are unpronounceable to anyone not 
trained in Chmese Taiwan however has clung to a modified version of the Wade Giles romamzation system 
originally developed m England Although the Wade Giles system has its advantages it is not a perfect system 
either and it is rarely used outside of Taiwan Taiwanese use of Wade Giles makes standard mainland terms 
seem alien and confuses many Many articles have appeared in the Taiwanese media recently concerning the 
issue of romamzation in Taiwan These articles indicate a new openness on the part of Taiwan to discuss the 
relative merits of the Pmym system of romamzation employed on the mainland
It may not seem immediately relevant but a glance at Yahoo s web site gives some sense of the shifts m 
the boundaries of China engendered by technological and cultural change Yahoo is not a political entity and 
it never comes up as a player at meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Nevertheless it has profound influence on the manner m which 
international relations are perceived around the globe There is a section of the Yahoo web page list that
11
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includes the following web pages Asia China Hong Kong Singapore and Taiwan Each has its 
own distinctive layout and the five are linked closely with each other There are not many barriers between 
these five cyber worlds and if anything observers are encouraged to wander through all five No trace of 
confrontation or competition is visible on the surface of the pages whatsoever For example the link to the 
China page is directly accessible from the Taiwan page Moreover there is also a United States m 
Chinese web page dedicated to domestic matters but presented entirely m the Chinese language The United 
States itself is to some degree integrated within this imagined Chinese world Spanish is the only other foreign 
language in which a page for the United States appears Yahoo s format is indicative of the formation of a fine 
web of cultural technological and institutional links between institutions and information sources using the 
Chmese language throughout the world Such links do not mean that states are merging but we still do not 
know what the limits are to the impact of such connections If ties between corporations individuals 
associations and even public entities increase as part of the technologically driven process of globalization can 
we be at all sure what the point would be at which political independence steps m to put a break on such 
integration9 The variety of web pages available in Chinese stands in marked contrast to the complete lack of 
such Yahoo links to many countries throughout the world In any case even if Yahoo has no political 
significance whatsoever the children of Taiwanese and mainland politicians employ Yahoo daily The 
architecture of international Chmese culture that they imbibe from their surfing will determine the manner in 
which they conceive of the political landscape In turn the discussion around the dining room table concerning 
politics will be subtly influenced by those contours Such a process will make it increasingly difficult to make 
extreme or confrontational arguments—not because such arguments do not make sense but because they do not 
conform to this gelling cultural configuration
The results of such shifts are already visible A visit to one of the many web site chat rooms open for 
discussion in Chmese concerning Taiwan mainland relations reveals many interactions between Taiwanese and 
mainlanders Yet many of those discussions are rather subdued and many concern cultural issues presented m a 
neutral tone I was unable to find anything like the ugly confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians that 
unfold elsewhere in cyberspace Taiwanese television features extended specials on the mainland introducing 
the food and habits of various regions Such programs consist often of animated conversations between 
Taiwanese and mainlanders that do not suggest the slightest disagreement The emphasis falls rather on the 
Taiwanese rediscovery of the mainland
CONCLUSION
The debate among scholars of political science m recent years has unfolded between those who see the impact 
of globalization and rapidly developing world wide interconnectedness as heralding a profound change m the 
nature of human relations on the one hand and those who assert that the nation state and its institutions are 
stable and growing in authority Some hold that the globalization of markets and mtemet linkage makes us 
increasingly part of a global village while others argue that regionalism and nationalism are more prevalent 
today than they were twenty years ago The question we must ask ourselves is whether these two trends are 
mutually exclusive Could it be whether we are talking about Taiwan s relationship to the mainland or Turkey s 
relationship to Europe that local cultural identity is becommg increasingly critical at precisely the moment that 
a large part of the political and economic machinery across the globe becomes increasingly integrated into 
larger systems and sets of systems9 Could it be that both sides of the argument will ultimately be true9 Perhaps 
we will find ourselves m a world with greater autonomy at the regional level but less autonomy for specific 
sectors of the body politic because of their integration into international systems And might it even be true that 
the growing nationalism that we see across the globe is a natural response to globalization that at certain 
moments may impede the growth of connective tissue but as a whole gives vent to inevitable frustrations and 
thereby plays its own role in the process9
Oddly enough the decline of Communism as a unifying ideology on the mainland has only increased the 
emotional content for many mamlanders of Taiwan s status The essentially capitalist economy of the mainland 
has left the Communist Party scrambling to find new ways of justifying its existence The Communist Party s 
support of nationalism (minzuzhuyi) has become a major theme m public releases Some articles have literally 
rewritten the history of Communism so as to appear entirely a nationalist struggle Thus the confrontation with 
Taiwan is unnecessarily exacerbated by the search for a nationalist justification for the current system of 
government
What can be done to insure a fair and permanent solution to Taiwan s status9 It is clear that Taiwan cannot 
be completely independent economically or culturally from the mainland and that there will be no choice but 
engagement for the immediate future The question is how Taiwan s engagement with Chma differs from that 
of Korea or Japan There are several concrete approaches for working towards a peaceful and lasting solution to 
the Taiwan question that take into account the complex historical background of this conflict The first step is to 
encourage reform in government of the People s Republic of China Such a step is so obvious and naive that it 
barely seems worth mentioning but recent reforms undertaken in China required by membership m the World 
Trade Organization have given at least the hope that real change is possible on the mainland Perhaps the 
importance of China s international image at the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics will be a far greater 
impetus than any particular policy foreign governments take to encourage reform The second step is for the 
nations of the world to do their utmost to integrate the People s Republic of China into international bodies such 
as the World Trade Organization the United Nations and other non governmental organizations (NGOs) The 
more multilateral roles Chma must play and the greater its share of international responsibility the higher its 
sensitivity to international standards will be The third step is for the international community to do its best to 
promote the rule of law accountability and democracy in its many aspects to representatives of the People s 
Republic of China as they grapple for solutions to the problems of the twenty first century The better the model 
exhibited by nations like the United States the more appealmg the implementation of such reforms will appear
The nations of the world should also do their best to promote the autonomy of individual provinces m 
Chma relative to Beijing The greatest hope for Chma at the present moment has been the ability of local 
government to institute reforms and even implement democratic institutions without the interference of the 
central government The more relative autonomy the individual provinces have on the mainland the less 
offensive integration mto a larger Chinese federation will be to Taiwan And the more power is distributed 
throughout the provmces the less threatened Taiwan Korea and Japan will be by the concentration of 
economic and technological resources in the hands of a few men in Beijing
13
14 Emanuel Pastreich
The Chinese scholar Yang Xiaokai has made elaborate arguments that the economic and cultural strength 
of Europe was bom out of its fragmentation and diversity which Yang argues allowed heterodox thinking to 
find refuge Yang argues that competition between England and France from the sixteenth to nineteenth 
centimes encouraged economic and cultural development and such internal division within China can have a 
similarly salutary influence 14 If China could in fact become something closer to the United States of China it 
would be far easier to establish a lasting security configuration m East Asia that accounts for the new role of 
China but does not present the asymmetrical configuration of a Chmese colossus on the one side and Japan 
Korea and other nations on the other
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